Competition in investment banking  by Ellis, Katrina et al.
RC
K
a
b
c
I
f
s
i
i
o
s
E
1
A
P
S
deview of Development Finance 2011 1, 28–46
Africagrowth Institute
Review of Development Finance
www.elsevier.com/locate/rdf
www.sciencedirect.com
ompetition in investment banking
atrina Ellis a, Roni Michaely b,c,∗, Maureen O’Hara c
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Australia
IDC, Israel
Cornell University, United States
JEL CLASSIFICATION
G14;
G20;
G24
KEYWORDS
Abstract We construct a comprehensive measure of overall investment banking competitiveness for
follow-on offerings that aggregates the various dimensions of competition such as fees, pricing accuracy,
analyst recommendations, distributional abilities, market making prowess, debt offering capabilities, and
overall reputation. The measure allows us to incorporate trade-offs that investment banks may use in
competing for new or established clients. We find that firms who switch to similar-quality underwritersInvestment banking;
Competition;
Analyst recommendations;
Equity issuances;
enjoy more intense competition among investment banks which manifests in lower fees and more optimistic
recommendations. Investment banks do compete vigorously for some clients, with the level of competition
related to the likelihood of gaining or losing clients. Finally, investment banks not performing up to market
norms are more likely to be dropped in the follow-on offering. In contrast, firms who seek a higher reputation
underwriter face relatively non-competitive markets.
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nvestment banks play a crucial role in the capital raising process
or firms. Recently, the nature of this role has come under increasing
crutiny, as evidenced by myriad investigations (and lawsuits) alleg-
ng collusive behavior, corrupt practices, and rapacious behavior by
nvestment banks in the equity raising process. Specific allegations
f misbehavior include biased analyst reports, after-market trading
candals, price-fixing, and collusion in the allocation and distribu-∗ Corresponding author.
-mail address: rm34@cornell.edu (R. Michaely).
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ion of offerings. The recent Global Settlement separating research
rom the underwriting process is but one example of the regulatory
oncerns with the competitive nature and practices of this industry.
Despite these concerns, the exact nature and extent of competi-
ive behavior in investment banking remains elusive. The difficulty
n evaluating the competitive process stems from its complex-
ty: underwriters provide a panoply of services, and so potentially
ompete through fees, pricing accuracy, analyst recommendations,
istributional abilities, market making prowess, debt offering capa-
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ilities, and overall reputation. There is a large literature in finance
xamining investment banking and much of this work has focused on
ndividual components of the competitive process, showing that pro-
ision of these services is linked with being an underwriter.1 What
1 For example, fees in Chen and Ritter (2000), Burch et al. (2005); pricing
iscounts in Corwin (2003); analyst coverage in Corwin and Schultz (2005),
jungqvist et al. (2006), Michaely and Womack (1999); market making in
llis et al. (2000); reputation in Krigman et al. (2001); and other services in
enzoni and Schenone, 2010, Corwin and Schultz (2005), Drucker and Puri
2005), and Bharath et al. (2005).
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is not apparent from extant research is how all of these dimensions
combine to determine the overall nature of competition in invest-
ment banking. Do investment banks compete across the board in all
these competitive dimensions, or do they take a strategy of compet-
ing along some dimensions and being less competitive along others?
Or might they not compete at all, relying instead upon intangibles,
such as market power and reputation to attract or retain business?
In this research, we seek to understand competition in investment
banking at this aggregate level. To do so, we first address the basic
question: How do underwriters compete for equity underwriting
mandates? We conduct our analysis in the context of the market for
underwriting services for follow-on equity offerings. This junction is
particularly well suited for our purpose because many firms change
underwriters from one equity offering to the next (see Krigman et
al., 2001). In this process, investment banks can compete on many
dimensions to attract new clients or to retain old ones, such as fees
and discounts2, reputation, analyst coverage, debt market capac-
ity, and market making prowess. We investigate how these factors
influence a firm’s decision to retain or switch its underwriter.
While previous literature examines several aspects of compet-
itive behavior across all potential underwriters, we focus most of
our attention on the competitive behavior of the dominant partic-
ipants. In this sense, our analysis can be viewed as a conditional
analysis, compared with the unconditional analysis via a McFad-
den choice model (see Corwin and Schultz, 2005; Yasuda, 2005;
Drucker and Puri, 2005). In these models, the authors use a pool
of potential underwriters and the unconditional probability of being
selected as an underwriter based on a particular investment-banking
characteristic. We use this approach and find results similar to prior
literature, but also find that most potential underwriters are pas-
sive, so including them in the analysis masks important differences
between those who win the deal and those who do not. Therefore,
our main focus is on the variation in investment banking characteris-
tics, conditional on being chosen as an underwriter. The conditional
analysis enables us to gain insights that are unattainable from the
unconditional analysis alone. For example, compared to all potential
underwriters, having a prior debt relationship with the equity-issuer
is an important element in winning a deal. However, among those
banks that are really in the running, prior debt relationship is not a
distinguishing feature.
Rather than analyzing each element of the investment banking
service to equity-issuer firms in isolation, we develop a comprehen-
sive measure of overall investment banking competitiveness that
captures non-price competition (e.g., reputation) as well as price
competition (e.g., fees). This measure, the first that we are aware
of to aggregate the various dimensions of competition, allows us to
incorporate trade-offs that banks may use in competing for new or
established clients. Thus, we are able to capture whether banks that
charge higher fees compensate with better analyst coverage, market
making activity, or the like, and whether banks choose to compete
more vigorously for some types of clients than for others.
We hypothesize that if the market for underwriting is competitive
then, after controlling for deal attributes, the overall competitiveness
measure will be the same across firms. If, however, the market for
underwriting is not competitive, then underwriters may or may not
provide services to a firm, and the overall competitiveness measure
for such deals will differ.
2 As there is a prevailing market price for a seasoned equity offering, the
discount refers to the difference in price between the last closing price and
the offering price.
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Using our competitiveness measure, we develop logistic regres-
ions to estimate the likelihoods of losing or gaining an underwriting
lient. These regressions provide empirical evidence of the relative
mportance of the various elements of competition.
Our analysis on the extent of competition provides a number of
mportant findings, four of which we highlight here. First, we find
hat the degree of market competitiveness is related to the motive
or switching. Firms who seek a higher reputation underwriter face
elatively non-competitive markets: underwriters offer few other
nducements to switch, and “upgrading” firms pay higher fees to
o so. Similarly, firms whose own performance has been weak may
nd their previous underwriter unwilling to continue in that capacity,
nd these switching firms also face higher fees and little competi-
ion for their business. This difficulty highlights the fact, also noted
y Fernando et al. (2005), that competition in investment banking
s best viewed as a matching problem: due to the prominent role of
eputation, both investment banks and firms are careful about the
ompany they keep.
Second, we show that investment banks do compete vigorously
or some clients, with the level of competition related to the likeli-
ood of gaining or losing clients. Investment banks reward loyalty,
nd non-switching clients tend to pay lower fees, and have more pos-
tive analyst ratings.3 Interestingly, loyalty also goes both ways, as
lients who enjoy better service before their new offerings are much
ore likely to remain with their underwriters. For customers who do
witch to similarly ranked underwriters (so-called ‘lateral’ switch-
rs), our overall competitive measure shows greater competition for
hese clients.
Third, we find that investment banks not performing up to market
orms are more likely to be dropped in the follow-on offering. These
orms differ across the various dimensions of competition: analyst
ecommendations below or even at the norm induce exit, with firms
enerally moving to a bank with a more optimistic view. Conversely,
hile market making below the norm also induces exit, issuers move
o firms already dominant in market making only 30% of the time.
verall, our results suggest that aggressive investment banks are
ble to steal customers away from incumbent banks that perform
elow par, a result in accord with markets being competitive.
Fourth, we also develop a measure of investment bank loy-
lty. When we examine competitiveness at the investment bank
evel, rather than per deal, we find that the investment banks
hat are more competitive have more loyal clients. This sug-
ests that although investment banks may selectively compete for
ome deals more than others, there are also differences between
anks in average competitiveness, which corresponds to client
oyalty.
Because our analysis of the overall competitiveness of the mar-
et necessarily requires analyses of the specific dimensions of this
ompetition, our work also contributes to the extensive literature
ooking at the specific elements of investment banking. In particu-
ar, our results on fees, pricing, analyst coverage, market making,
nd ancillary services complement, extend, and occasionally con-
radict findings in this very large literature. With respect to fees, for
xample, Chen and Ritter (2000) show a cross-sectional variability
n fees for follow-on equity offerings, a result we also find. Burch
t al. (2005) also examine fees in follow-on offering, but while they
nd that switchers to “better” underwriters pay lower fees, we find
3 These results are also consistent with Diamond (1984, 1991), Peterson
nd Rajan (1994) and Schnenone (2004) that banks with existing relationship
ith a firm obtains information about the firm that others do not have.
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he opposite. Switching firms in our sample, whether they move up
r down, pay higher fees.4
Another dimension of competition is the issue price, measured
s the discount relative to the previously traded price. The invest-
ent banks’ pricing discretion here is limited since a market price
or the securities exists long before the announcement or pricing
f the follow-on offering. Existing evidence (e.g., Corwin, 2003)
ndicates an average discount of about 2 percent, with a significant
ross sectional variation in the underpricing. The mean discount in
ur sample is 2.8%, and we find that, as with fees, firms switch-
ng to more reputable underwriters experience higher underpricing
iscounts.
The extent and enthusiasm of analyst coverage is also important
o issuers. Krigman et al. (2001) show that firms switch banks to gain
nalyst coverage, yet Ljungqvist et al. (2006) find that optimistic
nalyst recommendations do not lead to underwriting business.5
ichaely and Womack (1999) show that affiliated analysts are more
ptimistic than unaffiliated analysts, both at the time of the IPO and
he follow-on offering. Clarke et al. (2007) find that coverage by an
ll-star analyst increases investment bank deal flow, and, conversely,
liff and Denis (2004) show that firms are more likely to switch if
he old investment bank was not providing a recommendation on the
nniversary of the IPO date. We find that active analyst coverage
rior to the offering helps retain clients, and when reputation is
ot the drawing card, investment banks do compete for business by
roviding optimistic analyst coverage prior to the offering. Thus,
ur results suggest that failure to take account of the motives for
witching and their effect on investment bank competitiveness may
ccount for the sometimes conflicting results in this area.
As has been well established, reputation effects are important
o some issuers, and these issuers switch underwriters simply to be
onnected with a higher quality underwriter. Krigman et al. (2001)
how that “graduating” issuers attach a lesser importance to the
ctual performance of their old underwriter than do issuers who do
ot move up. Similar to Krigman et al. (2001), we find that reputation
lays an important role in inducing firms to switch underwriters.6Liquidity provision also matters for publicly traded firms, par-
icularly for smaller firms (e.g., Ellis et al., 2000). Investment banks
ypically opt to act as a dealer in a stock, but the extent of their
arket making activity can vary dramatically. Empirically we do
4 This difference between our work and Burch et al. (2005) may reflect
ifferent sample periods, or differences in the factors included in defining
rm loyalty.
5 Ljungqvist et al. (2006) find that unconditionally winning banks provide
ore optimistic recommendations than losing banks, a result they attribute
o economic incentives, i.e., career concerns of analysts, and pressure from
nvestment banks. They conclude that optimistic analyst recommendations
o not affect the probability of winning underwriting business. In their
nalysis, analyst recommendations are determined endogenously by the
ompeting forces of pressure from the investment bank to recommend a
otentially lucrative client, versus the analyst’s interest in protecting his or
er reputation. Since our focus is the overall competition for underwriting
usiness, we do not focus on why an analyst is providing a recommendation.
6 Another view is that firms and banks select each other. Not only do
rms look at the quality of the investment bank they are hiring, but invest-
ent banks examine the quality of the firms they are underwriting. Firms
hat improve (decline) in quality will switch to a higher (lower) reputation
nderwriter, whereas firms with no large change in quality are likely to form
stable relationship with an underwriter. Similarly, if the quality of the
nderwriter changes over time, then firms may switch if the quality of the
urrent underwriter no longer matches the firm’s quality (see, for discussion,
ernando et al., 2005).
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ot find market making activity to be an important element in the
election of a new underwriter. At the same time, underwriters that
erform below the norm along this dimension are less likely to be
etained.
Investment banks also compete by providing ancillary services
uch as loans, underwriting debt offerings, and advising on merger
ctivity. Several papers examine the link between bank lending and
quity underwriting (e.g., Drucker and Puri, 2005; Ljungqvist et al.,
006; Bharath et al., 2005). Drucker and Puri (2005) provide evi-
ence that investment banks that underwrite debt offerings around
he time of equity deals reduce the amount they charge for issuing
quity for the firm. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) and Bharath et al. (2005)
uggest that prior debt underwriting relationships and lending rela-
ionships increase the likelihood of winning deals. Consistent with
heir results, we find that underwriters who retain clients are more
ikely to have a prior debt underwriting or lending relationship with
he firm compared to other underwriters. However, we find that
hen a firm switches investment banks, the new lead underwriter
oes not have a stronger debt relationship with the firm than the old
ead underwriter did. Overall, we find limited public-debt-issuance
ctivity around the time of the equity offering (around 6% of the
ample) for the follow-on offerings in our sample.7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out our sam-
le, the data we use, and details the characteristics of the issuing
rms and the underwriters of these issues. In this section, we also
rovide results on overall switching behavior, and the movement of
ssues to better quality, lateral quality, and lower quality underwrit-
rs. Section 3 then examines the elements of competition by looking
t fees and discounts, analyst recommendations and market making
ctivity around follow on equity offerings. In Section 4 we look at
he overall competition for these offerings. We develop our aggre-
ate measure of underwriter quality and show how it relates to the
lements of competition developed in Section 3. We also develop a
easure of underwriter loyalty and relate this to the competitiveness
f the underwriter in attracting and retaining clients. We then pro-
ide logistic regressions modeling the probability of losing a client,
nd the likelihood of gaining a client. The paper’s final section sum-
arizes our results and provides some conclusions on the nature of
ompetition in investment banking.
. Data and preliminary analysis: offerings, underwriters,
nd issuers
.1. Sample selection
e obtained a sample of U.S. seasoned equity offerings during the
eriod 1996–2003 from the SDC global offerings database (4365
fferings). To ensure comparability across sample firms, we exclude
fferings that were registered as shelf offerings under SEC Rule
15 (1203 offerings), and offerings that were entirely secondary
hares (380 offerings).8 We excluded 41 firms that had joint lead
7 Many of the firms in our sample (1148) have private debt initiated during
he 5 years before the follow-on offerings but of these, only 31 are with
he underwriter of the follow-on offering. Sample differences, particularly
ith respect to shelf registered issues, are likely the reason for the different
ndings here and in Drucker and Puri (2005).
8 Because of the different process governing disclosure and distribution of
helf-registered offers, the under-pricing discount, analysts’ and market mak-
ng activity prior to the offerings cannot be compared to non-shelf offerings.
econdary share offerings are more akin to large block trades by insiders
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underwriters as these underwriters share the responsibility for the
offering, and this could affect the underwriter behavior studied here.
We also excluded offerings by foreign firms; OTCBB or Nasdaq
small cap offerings; closed-end funds, and real estate investment
trusts; ADRs, or securities with warrants attached. Finally, we also
deleted a number of offerings due to missing data: not underwritten
or no identifiable underwriter in previous equity deals. The final
sample is 1277 follow-on offerings. We allow firms to have multiple
follow-on offerings in our sample.
To determine whether firms switched underwriters or not, we
examined the SDC database for previous equity offerings by the
same issuer since 1990, and noted the identity of the lead underwriter
in the most recent equity offering prior to the sample event. One
difficulty that arises in doing so is that over this sample period there
were a number of mergers of investment banking firms. We collected
information on all of these mergers, and we then designated as part of
the successor investment bank any merger partners. Thus, an issuer
using Alex Brown as the underwriter for its IPO and Deutsche Bank
as the underwriter for its follow-on offering would be classified as
a non-switcher for purposes of this analysis because Alex Brown is
now a part of Deutsche Bank.9
We obtained monthly market making volume data from the Nas-
daq for January 1996–March 2002 for a subset of 885 Nasdaq firms
in our sample. Analyst coverage and recommendations were pro-
vided by IBES. Daily trading price data are from CRSP. Public debt
underwriting data are collected from SDC debt offerings and we
include all debt issued within five years prior to the equity offering
date and identify the lead underwriter of the debt offering. Private
loan underwriting data are collected from Dealscan. For the private
loans we identify the loan arranger and include loans during the five
years prior to the equity offering.
There are 79 distinct lead underwriters for the 1277 offerings
in our sample. Collectively, the 10 most active underwriters cover
approximately 76% of the dollar value of follow-on offerings in
our sample. As a simple measure of underwriter reputation, we
ranked lead underwriters of the universe of equity offerings dur-
ing 1996–2003 using the Carter and Manaster ranks (see Carter and
Manaster, 1990 for discussion).10 These ranks range from 1 to 9,
with more prestigous underwriters having higher ranks.
1.2. Switching and non-switching issuersThe issues surrounding the retention of existing clients and attracting
new ones can be developed more fully by considering the frequency
with which issuing firms switch underwriters for the follow-on offer-
desiring liquidity, as opposed to the more standard offering motivation of
firms seeking to raise capital.
9 Alex Brown was purchased by Bankers Trust in 1997. Banker’s Trust
was then taken over by Deutsche Bank in 1999.
10 We use the Carter–Manaster reputation variable, rather than the
Megginson and Weiss (1991) market share variable as our measure of repu-
tation because we want to compare reputation across investment banks and
the CM rank facilitates this. For example, many investment banks have the
same rank (e.g. Goldman Sachs and Citigroup both have CM rank 9), so
we can differentiate between small changes in reputation (one rank above
or below) versus large changes in reputation which involve moving several
CM ranks. By contrast, the MW reputation measure is a continuous variable,
and thus classifying a difference in market share as small or large would be
arbitrary. We redid our anaysis using the MW measure instead of the CM
measure, but the results were so similar that we report here only those based
on the Carter–Manaster ranking.
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ngs in our sample. Table 1 shows that switching is a frequent
vent: 44% of issuing firms (557 out of 1277) switched underwrit-
rs from their previous offering. This figure is higher than the 31%
eported by Krigman et al. (2001), and it is consistent with changes
n the investment banking industry landscape, such as the demise
f the Glass-Steagall Act, having increased competition in the more
ecent sample period we study here.11 For our purposes, the fact that
lmost half of the follow-on offerings are being led by a new under-
riter suggests that there is significant competition for underwriting
ollow-on offerings.
Where do these switching firms go? We identify five groups
f switching firms based on the difference in Carter and Manaster
1990) reputation ranks of the current and prior lead underwriters.12
e find that most firms switch to an underwriter of either the same
M rank, or one rank above or below, and thus use these as cutoffs
o separate our switching firms. One-third of the switching firms
181 out of 557) are same rank switchers: they change to a lead
nderwriter that has the same CM rank, with most of these under-
riters having high ranks (8 or 9). A small number (30) of our issuers
re large downgraders: issuers that change to an underwriter who
s more than one CM rank below the prior underwriter, with the
verage issuer selecting an underwriter 2.9 ranks below the prior
nderwriter. Seventy-nine firms are lateral downgraders, moving
own one CM rank: most frequently from 9 to 8, or 8 to 7. Another
roup of 124 switching firms are lateral upgraders, moving up one
M rank and most frequently moving from 7 to 8, or 8 to 9. The
emaining 143 switching firms are the large upgraders: firms that
witch to an underwriter of much higher reputation than their prior
nderwriter (more than one CM rank above). The average change in
eputation is 3.44 CM ranks for the large upgraders, with most firms
oving to an underwriter ranked 7, 8 or 9 on the Carter–Manaster
cale.
.3. Offering statistics
he offerings in our sample are typical of the follow-on offerings
tudied in other research. In Table 2 we report a wide range of
escriptive statistics, with means and medians given to reflect the
iversity in the underlying sample. The average issuer has a market
apitalization of approximately $1 billion, they have not had a pre-
ious offering in more than 2 years (837 days), the offering amount
s around $130 million, mostly primary shares. Fees average 5.19%,
here is a negative share price announcement effect (−2.27%), and
further price discount connected with the offering (−2.79%).
Table 2 also shows important differences between switch-
ng issuers and non-switching issuers. Non-switching issuers, and
ssuers that switch to a same rank investment bank, tend to be larger
nd the offering size is larger as well. The average fees paid by non-
witchers are only 5.01%, significantly lower than the fees paid by
witching firms. A smaller fraction of shares are primary shares
or non-switchers than for switching firms. Breaking the switching
ample down further reveals that large movers (in terms of upgrad-
ng or downgrading by more than one Carter–Manaster rank) are
enerally much smaller firms. Gross spreads for large movers are
11 If we limit our sample to the 754 equity offerings that are the first sea-
oned offering since the firm’s IPO, our rate of switching is 38% which is
till higher than the Krigman et al. (2001) study, suggesting that switching
ay have increased over time.
12 As our sample is from 1996 to 2003 we use updated Carter–Manaster
anks available on Jay Ritter’s website.
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Table 1 Frequency of switching and change in underwriter quality. This table shows the number of firms in our sample of 1277 that change
lead underwriters from the prior equity offering to the sample offering. Non-switcher firms retain the same lead underwriter from the prior
offering. Five sub-groups of switchers are identified based on the Carter and Manaster (1990) (CM) rank of the lead underwriter: Same CM rank
are those firms that switch to another investment bank with the same CM rank; large downgrading (upgrading) firms are those that move to an
underwriter with a lower (higher) CM rank and the difference in rank is greater than one. Lateral downgrading (upgrading) firms are those that
move to an underwriter with a CM rank that is one rank below (above) the prior underwriter’s CM rank. The mean change in CM rank from the
prior underwriter to the current underwriter is calculated for each sub-group. The frequency of lead underwriters with CM ranks 2–9 are given
for each subgroup, with 9 being the highest Carter–Manaster rank.
No. offerings Mean CM
rank change
Follow-on offering underwriter CM rank
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Non-switcher firms 720 0 1 3 1 40 24 59 167 425
All switcher firms 557 0.81 5 5 3 29 12 60 170 273
Same CM rank 181 0 1 2 0 1 1 7 41 128
Large downgrading firms 30 −2.90 1 1 0 17 2 9 0 0
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lLateral downgrading firms 79 −1 2 0
Lateral upgrading firms 124 1 0 2
Large upgrading firms 143 3.44 0 0
lso significantly higher than they are for switchers in general, and
igher still than for non-switching firms. Interestingly, announce-
ent effects are least negative for the large up-or-down switchers,
ut their price discounts are largest.
The F-statistics in the last column demonstrate that the means
f the descriptive statistics of the various categories of sample firms
switchers/non-switchers, large switchers/small switchers, etc.) are
ignificantly different from each other. This variability suggests that
he follow-on offering process results in a wide diversity of outcomes
or issuers and investment banks alike. In the next sections, we inves-
igate this diversity by analyzing the main elements of competition
n the follow-on offering process.
. Elements of competition
.1. Are investment banks active?
s our focus is on the cross-section of lead underwriters, rather than
omparing lead underwriters to non-underwriters, it is important to
rst establish that this focus is appropriate. Other work has compared
he behavior of lead underwriters to unaffiliated investment banks13
nd shown that analyst coverage and debt underwriting is linked to
ecoming the lead underwriter. As we are examining market making
n addition to these services, we could potentially have a large pool
f investment banks with whom to compare the lead underwriters.
able 3 shows the pool of investment banks for our deals: the total
umber of investment banks is 411 per deal.
However when we focus on investment banks that are actively
nvolved with the firm prior to the offering, the numbers drop dras-
ically. For example, the average firm in our sample only has 3.7
nvestment bank analysts providing buy/sell recommendations 90
ays prior to the offering, and has only 0.7 investment banks acting
s a debt underwriter or loan arranger in the five years prior to the
eal. For the subset of our sample that trades on Nasdaq, there are
6.6 investment banks acting as market makers three months prior
o the deal.
13 Commercial banks that underwrite equity deals are included in our sam-
le as investment banks.
t
t1 4 0 18 53 0
1 1 2 5 34 79
1 6 7 21 42 66
Overall, for non-Nasdaq firms, the number of investment banks
hat are either providing analyst coverage or have arranged a loan,
xcluding both the current and prior lead underwriter is 4.3. When
e limit this further to investment banks that have a CM rank at
east as high as the lead underwriter, there are on average 1.5 such
nvestment banks per company. For Nasdaq firms, there are 17.3
ctive investment banks (act as a market maker, provide analyst
overage, or have arranged a loan) but only 4 investment banks that
re also ranked at least as highly as the lead underwriter. These
umbers suggest that it is rare to find investment banks with links
o equity-issuing companies, and including all investment banks in
he pool of potential underwriters would result in the inclusion of
any inactive underwriters.
In addition, despite the low frequency of active investment banks,
he majority of current and prior lead underwriters are active. For
asdaq firms, the current lead underwriter is active14 86% of the
ime, while the prior lead underwriter is active 95% of the time.
or non-Nasdaq deals, the current lead underwriter is active 63%
f the time and the prior lead is active 60% of the time. These
articipation rates vary across switching, in particular for the non-
asdaq switching deals, the current lead underwriter is only active
7% of the time.
Given the infrequency of links between non-underwriting invest-
ent banks and equity-issuing firms, and the contrasting high
requency of links between underwriters and equity issuers, it is
ot surprising that prior work has found strong connections between
nalyst coverage, debt underwriting and the likelihood of being cho-
en as an underwriter. However, it does also suggest that comparing
on-underwriters to underwriters results in comparing two distinct
roups. Thus, we choose to focus on examining the cross-sectional
ifferences among lead underwriters, and also in comparing new
ead underwriters to prior lead underwriters.14 An active investment bank provides analyst coverage 90 days prior to
he deal or has arranged a loan in the last 5 years or acts as a market maker
hree months prior to the deal.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics. Summary statistics of the sample of 1277 NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq follow-on equity offerings during
1996–2003. Market capitalization is the market value of equity on the day prior to the offering in millions. The offering details are: dollar value
of the equity offering in millions (offering amount), number of shares in the offering in millions (shares offered, price of the SEO in dollars
(offer price), fraction of the offer that is new shares rather than insider sales (primary shares), fraction of the company that is being sold (float),
fee paid to underwriters (gross spread), lockup days following SEO (lock-up period). Price reactions around the SEO are: three-day cumulative
abnormal return around filing date of offering (announcement return), one year cumulative abnormal return prior to filing date (one year CAR),
percent difference between closing price on the day prior to the offering and the offering price (pricing discount), standard deviation of returns
over 90 days prior to filing date (price volatility). Time from filing to offer date is measured in days (days from filing to completion) and the time
since the last equity offering is measured in days (days since last offering). Underwriter reputation is measured by the Carter–Manaster rank
for the lead underwriter of the last equity offering (old lead CM rank) and current lead underwriter (new lead CM rank). The frequency of old
lead underwriters acting as a co-manager is given for the deals with new lead underwriters. The four debt variables measure the frequency of the
old/new lead underwriter acting as lead underwriter for a public debt offering or arranger for a syndicated loan.
Whole sample Non switcher Large down Lateral down Same rank Lateral up Large up Test for equality
No. obs. 1277 720 30 79 181 124 143
Market cap
Mean 1007.9 1220 303 477 1317 585 360 5.9
Median 414.6 475 154 311 523 327 208 103.7
Offering amount
Mean 133.4 153.6 47.7 77.2 166.7 98.1 68.8 8.9
Median 79.8 92.4 43.8 58.8 80.3 73.0 53.0 99.1
Primary shares
Mean 76.9% 71.9 90.5 84.7 82.9 81.6 82.8 11.7
Median 88.9% 80 100 100 99 95 94 62.1
Float
Mean 23.2% 22.5 30.1 21.9 20.4 24.9 27.4 4.6
Median 19.9% 19 22 21 17 23 24 26.1
Gross spread
Mean 5.19% 5.01 5.86 5.50 5.11 5.33 5.72 30.9
Median 5.23% 5.00 5.80 5.50 5.19 5.26 5.75 159.2
Announcement return
Mean −2.27% −2.40 0.78 −2.11 −2.38 −2.65 −1.93 1.1
Median −2.43% −2.52 1.20 −1.70 −2.35 −3.45 −2.34 7.5
One year CAR
Mean 75.2% 68.5 98.0 93.8 83.4 80.9 78.3 4.6
Median 61.0% 56.7 80.6 82.8 66.4 61.2 65.5 17.5
Pricing discount
Mean −2.79% −2.37 −4.43 −4.13 −2.72 −2.57 −4.15 12.3
Median −1.96% −1.62 −4.16 −3.05 −2.06 −1.96 −3.27 48.8
Price volatility
Mean 4.38% 4.50 4.65 4.67 4.10 4.03 4.23 2.1
Median 3.88% 3.79 4.32 4.37 3.66 3.75 3.96 7.9
Days between filing and completion
Mean 35 32 46 38 36 36 43 7.9
Median 29 27 40 30 30 30 36 79.5
Days since last offering
Mean 837 547 1733 1421 1265 1087 1023 71.7
Median 555 343 1647 1322 1149 897 839 305.5
Old lead CM rank
Mean 7.82 8.25 8.4 8.34 8.55 7.43 4.62 219.5
Median 8 9 9 9 9 8 5 480.1
New lead CM rank
Mean 8.16 8.25 5.5 7.34 8.55 8.43 8.06 45.5
Median 9 9 5 8 9 9 8 190.3
Old lead is co manager
Mean 36.7% – 10% 20.3% 38.1% 42.7% 44.1% 6.2
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 2 (Continued )
Whole sample Non switcher Large down Lateral down Same rank Lateral up Large up Test for equality
New lead public debt
Mean 4.46% 5.97% 0.00% 3.80% 3.31% 3.23% 0.70% 2.2
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Old lead public debt
Mean 4.69% 5.97% 0.00% 0.00% 6.63% 4.03% 0.00% 3.4
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New lead private debt
Mean 4.53% 5.97% 3.33% 3.80% 4.97% 5.65% 3.50% 0.4
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Mean 5.39% 5.97% 0.00% 2.5
Median 0 0 0 0
.2. Fee and price competition
or equity offerings, firms incur direct cost through underwriting
ees as well as indirect costs via the discount of the offer price rela-
ive to the prevailing market price. As noted in Table 2, average fees
re 5.19% of the proceeds, and the average discount is 2.79%. While
here is no discernable pattern in fees and discounts over time, there
s a considerable cross-sectional spread in the fees paid, ranging
rom 1.45% to 8.91% and the pricing discount ranges from −26%
o +13%. Consistent with Burch et al. (2005), non-switching firms
ay lower fees than switching firms, and this difference of 40 basis
oints is statistically significant. These lower fees for repeat clients
re consistent with a strategy by the underwriter to retain loyal busi-
ess. Loyal firms are also rewarded via a smaller pricing discount:
2.37% versus −3.35% for firms that switch underwriters.
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Table 3 Number of investment banks in the pool of potential underwriter
involved in the firm prior to the offering. We include all 411 distinct invest
1992–2000 sample, and appear on either the IBES database or the list of
these investment banks are providing analyst coverage 90 days prior to th
arranger in the five years prior to the offering; and for Nasdaq firms, how
the offering. We count the total number of investment banks that are “acti
underwriter, or acting as a market maker (for Nasdaq firms). Next we restri
Carter–Manaster rank at least as high as the selected lead underwriter.
Whole sample Non switcher
No. obs. 1277 720
Number of investment banks 411 411
Number of IB Analysts 90 days prior 3.7 3.8
Number of IB lenders 0.7 0.7
Nasdaq firms
Number of Nasdaq offerings 885 519
Number of IB market makers 16.6 16.8
Number of active IB, excl old and new lead 16.0 16.4
Number of Active IB, CM rank ≥ new lead 4.0 3.9
% active new lead 86.2 99.4
% active old lead 95.2 99.4
Non-Nasdaq firms
Number of non-Nasdaq offerings 392 201
Number of active IB, excl old and new lead 4.3 4.6
Number of active IB, CM rank ≥ new lead 1.5 1.8
% active new lead 62.5 77.6
% active old lead 59.5 77.64.97% 2.42% 0.00% 2.8
0 0 0
We investigate how deal complexity affects the deal’s compet-
tive cost using multivariate regressions with either fees or pricing
iscount as dependent variables. As independent variables, we con-
rol for the difficulty of the marketing efforts and the due diligence
equired for the deal via size, measured as the log of the offering pro-
eeds, and stock price uncertainty, proxied by the standard deviation
f the return over three trading months prior to the announcement
f the offering. We also control for the change in the firm’s outlook
roxied by one year cumulative abnormal return prior to offering
nnouncement (CAR = (rit − rmt), t = 1, . . ., 252). We include the
ime since the last offering as Krigman et al. (2001) suggest that
he underwriter may be required to do more due diligence on the
rm, and hence charge a higher fee, if substantial time has passed.
e also include the underwriting ranking, dummy variables for
ur five categories of switching (large downgrade, lateral down-
s. For each firm we examine how many investment banks are actively
ment banks that have a Carter–Manaster rank in Jay Ritter’s updated
Nasdaq market makers during 1996–2002. We count how many of
e offering date; how many have acted as a debt underwriter or loan
many investment banks act as a market maker three months prior to
ve,” i.e., either providing analyst coverage or acting as a lender/debt
ct our pool of potential underwriters to investment banks who have a
Switcher Large down Lateral down Same rank Lateral up Large up
557 30 79 181 124 143
411 411 411 411 411 411
3.7 2.4 3.2 4.5 4.2 2.7
0.7 0.1 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.5
366 16 56 107 81 106
16.4 13.5 15 20.8 15.2 14
15.5 13.0 13.8 19.8 14.4 13.3
4.0 7.8 5.7 4.4 3.1 2.9
67.5 62.5 78.6 85.0 63.0 48.1
89.3 62.5 92.9 91.6 88.9 89.6
191 14 23 74 43 37
4.0 1.5 4.7 4.7 4.0 3.0
1.2 1.2 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.8
46.6 64.3 43.5 52.7 37.2 40.5
40.1 14.3 40.9 44.6 44.2 35.3
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Table 4 Direct and indirect costs. This table shows the results of two regressions: one modeling the fees (gross spread as a percent of amount
offered) and the other modeling the pricing discount (return from the close price the day before the offering to the offer price). The independent
variables are: size, measured by the log of the offering proceeds; risk, measured as the stock return standard deviation measured over the 90
days prior to filing. Five dummy variables are used for the five categories of switching based on Carter–Manaster ranks (large downgrade in
underwriter reputation, lateral downgrade in underwriter reputation, lateral upgrade in underwriter reputation and large upgrade in underwriter
reputation, switch within CM rank). The Carter–Manaster (CM) rank of the underwriter is on a 1–9 scale, with 9 representing the highest
reputation underwriters. The time since prior offering is in years, and the one year return prior to offering is the cumulative abnormal return
(CRSP value-weighted return is the market return). Year dummies are also included but not reported. Sample size is 1277 offerings. T-statistics
are in parentheses.
Dependent variable Fees Discount
Intercept 15.87 [46.5] −16.80 [−8.62]
Log amt −0.5640 [−28.53] 0.8765 [7.76]
Large downgrade 0.0449 [0.42] −0.9916 [−1.62]
Lateral downgrade 0.0602 [0.90] −1.0067 [−1.64]
Lateral upgrade 0.1604 [3.01] 0.0584 [0.19]
Large upgrade 0.3481 [6.87] −1.2046 [−4.16]
Same rank 0.1086 [2.31] −0.3661 [−1.36]
Stock price volatility 5.70 [5.85] −39.22 [−7.05]
CM rank of underwriter −0.0795 [−5.55] −0.0467 [−0.57]
0.00
0.09
56.2%
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grading or same rank switchers, the new lead underwriter is more
optimistic before the offering than is the old underwriter, suggesting
that greater optimism may be a reason for the switch. This finding
is consistent with the notion that upgraders move for reputation rea-
16 These <fn0080>results complement Krigman et al. (2001)’s finding that
a prime reason why firms switch underwriters is dissatisfaction with their
research coverage Krigman et al. (2001) find that only 68% of the lead
IPO managers for the switched firms covered the target firm ahead of theTime since prior offering −
One year return prior to offering
R2
grade, lateral upgrade, large upgrade, same rank), and year dummy
variables.
Table 4 shows that deal complexity does affect the cost of the
deal: smaller deals and firms with higher price volatility have higher
fees (in relative terms) and more pricing discount. High reputation
underwriters charge lower fees. Perhaps the most important result of
Table 3 is that after controlling for size and risk (and the other control
variables), underwriters for upgrading or same rank switchers do not
generally compete proactively on fees but downgrading switchers
do. On the dimension of underpricing, after controlling for deal
attributes, we find that the underwriters for large upgraders provide
worse underpricing discounts compare to the underpricing discount
of non-switching firms.
Overall, we find that fees and discounts vary with a deal’s com-
plexity. Firms that have a big upgrade in underwriter reputation pay
significantly higher fees and face steeper pricing discounts, even
after controlling for size and risk.
2.3. Analyst coverage
A second aspect of competition is analyst coverage. We first consider
the overall analysts’ interest in our sample of firms. Table 5 shows
the total number of analysts covering the sample firms before and
after the offering. Three months before the offering date, the firms
have on average 4.37 analysts providing buy/sell recommendations,
and this increases to 5.83 analysts three months after the offering.15
There is little difference in these numbers between switchers and
nonswitchers, but there is considerable diversity in analyst cover-
age within switching firms. Large downgraders and large upgrading
firms tend to have fewer analysts, while those switching to same
ranked underwriters have the most analysts.
Do firms switch underwriters to add quality analyst coverage?
To address this, we examine the number of top tier analysts (ana-
15 The number of analysts 90 days prior to the offering differs from the
number in Table 3 because in Table 5 we are including non-investment bank
analysts as well as investment bank analysts.
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n97 [−1.07] −0.0739 [−1.43]
03 [2.89] −0.1120 [−0.63]
14.5%
ysts associated with a top 10 underwriter) for each firm. Prior to
he offering, firms have on average 0.77 top tier analysts providing
overage. After the offering, all firms increase the number of quality
nalysts making recommendations, but the increase is only signif-
cant for the large upgrading firms and the non-switching firms.
urprisingly, despite the increase in the number of analysts fol-
owing a firm, most switching firms do not gain top-tier coverage
hereas non-switching firms do.
To focus on whether underwriters strategically provide analyst
ecommendations around the offering to attract or retain busi-
ess, we compare the average recommendation 90 days before
nd after the offering date for the new lead underwriter, the old
ead underwriter, and the consensus recommendation. For non-
witchers, there is only a marginal increase in the lead underwriter’s
ecommendation around the offering. Compared to the consen-
us recommendation, however, the lead underwriter is significantly
ore positive.16 Hence, the non-switchers enjoy consistently high
ecommendations and so have little reason to seek them else-
here.
For switching firms, a different pattern emerges. For down-ollow-on offering, compared with 80% coverage for the non switchers.
hey also examined the number of research reports issued for the follow-
n offering firms, finding that for switchers the old lead provided only 1.27
eports in the 6 months prior to the follow-on offering while for non-switcher
he lead provided 3 reports. They conclude that firms will more likely to
witch when research coverage is minimal. Finally, they also documented
nother dimension of the competition for follow-on offering: a substantially
reater increase in All-Star lead manager analysts for the switchers than the
on-switchers.
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Table 5 Underwriter analyst recommendations around offering. This table presents the analyst recommendations from the prior lead (old lead), the current lead underwriter (new lead), and the
consensus of all other analysts (unaffiliated consensus). For non-switching firms, the old lead and the new lead are the same underwriter. The analyst recommendations are on a scale of 1 (low) to
5 (high). Sample size is 1265 firms as 12 had no analyst coverage. Analyst recommendations are on a scale of 1–5 with 5 representing a strong buy recommendation. Top tier analysts are analysts
from investment banks with a Carter–Manaster rank of 9.
Whole sample
(n = 1265)
Non-switchers
(n = 712)
Switchers
(n = 553)
Switchers
Large downgrade
(n = 30)
Lateral downgrade
(n = 78)
Same rank
(n = 179)
Lateral upgrade
(n = 123)
Large upgrade
(n = 143)
Number of analysts
90 days prior 4.37 4.31 4.45 2.93 3.96 5.49 4.88 3.35
90 days post 5.83 5.82 5.84 4.43 5.32 6.79 6.12 4.99
T test (over time) 10.31 8.44 6.12 2.48 2.58 1.74 2.91 4.15
Number of top tier analysts
90 days prior 0.77 0.9 0.6 0.13 0.35 0.92 0.78 0.27
90 days post 1.07 1.27 0.81 0.13 0.64 1.20 0.93 0.47
T test (over time) 5.64 5.13 2.76 0 1.63 1.74 0.79 1.87
New lead underwriter recommendation
90 days prior 4.46 4.47 4.43 4.36 4.58 4.40 4.38 4.45
N 793 567 226 14 40 92 42 38
90 days post 4.54 4.53 4.55 4.63 4.61 4.49 4.60 4.53
N 1050 600 450 24 64 142 102 118
T test (over time) 2.85 1.69 2.36 1.45 0.29 1.12 2.12 0.78
Old lead underwriter recommendation
90 days prior 4.42 4.47 4.31 3.57 3.90 4.20 4.51 4.55
N 823 567 256 7 29 93 67 60
90 days post 4.47 4.53 4.32 3.57 3.96 4.24 4.53 4.49
N 833 600 233 7 26 85 60 55
T test (over time) 1.51 1.69 0.15 0 0.32 0.3 0.22 -0.52
T-test (new vs. old)
90 days prior 1.25 0 1.98 2.81 4.13 1.97 -1 -0.83
90 days post 2.53 0 4.31 3.35 4.47 3.06 0.65 0.43
Unaffiliated consensus recommendation
90 days prior 4.31 4.35 4.26 3.74 4.19 4.25 4.31 4.38
N 1121 645 476 25 65 165 110 111
90 days post 4.35 4.39 4.31 4.03 4.27 4.29 4.30 4.43
N 1232 702 530 29 74 176 120 131
T-test (new lead vs. consensus)
90 days prior 5.48 3.67 3.53 2.66 3.26 1.88 0.67 0.54
90 days post 8.40 4.95 7.04 3.58 3.66 3.26 4.50 1.59
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sons, while other switchers are looking for better performance from
their underwriter.
The new underwriter is also more optimistic than the consensus
belief, both before and after the offering. This strongly positive
effect is found for all firms except for large upgraders. We conclude
that investment banks do use optimism as a competitive variable,
and winning banks distinguish themselves from their competitors
by offering more positive recommendations.17
2.4. Market making capabilities
A third potential dimension of competition relates to the underwrit-
ers’ market making activities. For stocks listing on the NYSE, the
specialist serves as market maker, and hence any market making
role by the underwriter is strictly passive.18 For stocks listed on the
Nasdaq, however, Ellis et al. (2000) show that the lead underwriter
in a Nasdaq IPO always makes a market for the stock and is almost
always the dominant market maker for the first few months the stock
is traded, controlling more than 50% of the order flow. Also, Ellis
et al. (2000) show that many market makers do very little volume,
and around 70% of the trading volume is done by three market mak-
ers. This suggests that market making may be an important variable
in the competition for Nasdaq-listed offerings, and that we should
examine, not only whether the lead underwriter is a market maker,
but whether or not the lead underwriter is one of the dominant market
makers.
We collect data from the NASD on issuing company trading vol-
ume executed by each underwriter in the period 3 months before
to 3 months after the offering for 885 Nasdaq offerings in our
sample during January 1996 to March 2002. The data in Table 6
reveal the average number of market makers per month for our
sample is 54 three months prior to the offering, and 69 market mak-
ers three months after the offering, and the range (not reported in
the table) varies from three market makers to 265. As suggested
by Ellis et al. (2000), there are “wholesaler” firms, such as Her-
zog or Knight Securities, who do not underwrite securities but
instead specialize in making markets. We link our market maker
identities to Carter–Manaster ranks to only include market mak-
ers who also do underwriting. With this restriction, the average
number of investment-bank market makers per stock is 17 three
months prior and 22 three months post offering, with a range of
1–86.
As many of these market makers may be doing very little trading
volume, we focus on the three market makers who are transacting
the most volume. Three months prior to the offering, the top three
market makers are doing 62.4% of the volume, and the old lead
underwriter is one of these dominant market makers in 72.7% of
stocks, whereas the new lead underwriter is for 63.5% of stocks.
As a benchmark, a non-lead underwriter investment bank with the
same or higher Carter–Manaster rank as the new lead underwriter
is one of the dominant market makers for only 42.3% of the stocks,
17 Examining each year of our sample separately, we do find that analyst
recommendations were overall lower in 2002–2003 following the Global
Settlement. Due to the small sample size per year we cannot determine
statistical significance, however, the same optimistic recommendations by
new lead underwriters (excepting large upgraders) prior to the deal were still
found in the yearly samples.
18 The underwriter could submit limit orders, for example, or actively par-
ticipate in block trades, but he cannot set the bid and ask quotes as he can
for Nasdaq-listed stocks.
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hus both the old and new lead underwriter are relatively active in
arket making prior to the offering.
The likelihood of the old or new lead underwriter being an active
arket maker is related to switching: old underwriters for switch-
ng firms were much less active market makers before the offering
han is the case for non-switching firms. Whereas nonswitching firm
nderwriter did about 30% of trading and was a dominant market
aker 87.7% of the time, the soon-to-be-replaced underwriter was
andling much less (an average of 17.8%), and was only a dominant
arket maker 51.6% of the time. These data suggest firms switch
ecause of less-active market making by the old underwriter.
For the switching firms, the new lead underwriter is less active in
arket making than the old lead underwriter when the firm switches
o a better or same ranked underwriter. However, when the firm
witches to a lower ranked underwriter, the new underwriter is
s active as the old underwriter in market making: doing 14% of
he trading volume versus 15% (difference not statistically signif-
cant) and acting as a dominant market maker in 25–37.5% of the
tocks versus 25–51.8% of the stocks (difference not statistically
ignificant). This suggests that market making activity may be more
mportant for these types of offerings. Overall, the data show that
or all switchers, the new underwriter takes on a much larger role
fter the offering, being a dominant market maker 68.7% of the time
hree months after the offering.
.5. Debt underwriting and loan arranging
nother connection between underwriters and equity issuers that
as been examined by Drucker and Puri (2005) is debt tie-ins to
quity deals. As we are focusing on the lead underwriter’s behav-
or prior to the deal, rather than what is being promised after the
eal, we examine lending links prior to the deal, not concurrent.
able 2 shows that less than five percent of our sample firms have
ad a public debt offering underwritten by either the old or new lead
nderwriter in the prior five years, and a similarly small portion of
ur sample has had a private loan arranged by either underwriter.
Table 3 shows that debt relationships between investment banks
nd equity issuers are rare: the average deal has less than one lender
ssociated with it. Although these numbers are very small, they are
onsistent with the sample size in Drucker and Puri, who found
.7% of SEOs (including shelf registrations) had debt tie-ins.
For switcher firms the new lead underwriter arranged a private
oan 3.3% of the time, compared to 0% of the time for the old lead
nderwriter, and the underwriters of non-switching firms had a debt
elationship 6.0% of the time. This suggests that debt relationships
an be another competitive strategy of underwriters, however they
re infrequent.
. Is the market competitive?
ur analysis thus far has separately analyzed the extent to which
ees, discounts, market making, prior debt offering, reputation, ana-
yst coverage and recommendations play a role in the competition
or follow-on offerings. We now take a broader perspective on the
ature of competition by allowing each dimension to enter into
comprehensive measure of competition or underwriter quality.
fter constructing an overall competitive score for each deal, we
xamine whether investment banks do indeed compete for under-
riting clients, and we relate the competitive score to investment
ank reputation, and the probability of gaining or losing clients.
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Table 6 Market making activity around follow on equity offerings. The sample in this table is restricted to Nasdaq offerings, January 1996 to March 2002, and the sample size is 885. These data
are from the Nasdaq monthly market making volume statistics. We focus on two particular months: the calendar month three months prior to the offer date and the calendar month three months post.
We include market makers who are registered and trade during the month. IB market makers are market makers who have a Carter–Manaster rank during 1992–2000 according to Jay Ritter’s updated
Carter–Manaster rankings. The top three market makers for each firm-month are the market makers that do the largest percentage of trading volume during the month. A “high-ranked” investment
bank is any investment bank with CM rank equal or above the CM rank of the new lead underwriter. The sample is split into six subgroups: the non-switchers use the same underwriter from offering
to offering, and the switching firms are split into five groups based on the change in Carter–Manaster ranking from the old lead underwriter to the new lead underwriter.
Whole sample
(n = 885)
Non-switchers
(n = 519)
Switchers
(n = 366)
Large
downgrade
(n = 16)
Lateral
downgrade
(n = 56)
Same rank
(n = 107)
Lateral
upgrade
(n = 81)
Large upgrade
(n = 106)
Number of market makers
90 days prior 53.7 54.3 52.8 44.9 49.4 68.0 48.5 43.8
90 days post 68.6 69.0 68.2 66.8 63.1 86.0 63.8 56.2
Number of IB market makers
90 days prior 16.6 16.8 16.4 13.5 15.0 20.8 15.2 14.0
90 days post 21.5 21.7 21.2 20.4 19.4 26.2 20.5 17.6
Old lead UW is in top 3
90 days prior 72.7% 87.7% 51.6% 25.0% 51.8% 54.2% 61.7% 45.3%
90 days post 64.0% 86.5% 32.4% 12.5% 37.5% 29.0% 43.8% 27.6%
New lead UW is in top 3
90 days prior 63.5% 87.7% 29.2% 25.0% 37.5% 38.3% 25.9% 18.9%
90 days post 79.1% 86.5% 68.7% 81.3% 60.7% 65.4% 66.3% 76.2%
High-ranked IB is in top 3
90 days prior 42.3% 49.3% 32.2% 56.3% 37.5% 32.7% 33.3% 24.5%
90 days post 49.6% 56.9% 39.3% 37.5% 48.2% 43.0% 35.0% 34.3%
Old UW volume
90 days prior 26.1% 31.3% 17.8% 14.6% 15.0% 17.3% 21.3% 17.5%
N 835 512 323 10 52 95 72 94
90 days post 21.0% 27.1% 10.9% 10.7% 11.0% 9.6% 12.5% 10.9%
N 820 514 305 8 47 91 71 88
New UW volume
90 days prior 25.1% 31.3% 11.8% 14.2% 13.9% 11.5% 10.4% 11.3%
N 750 512 237 10 43 89 47 48
90 days post 23.6% 27.1% 18.6% 25.8% 16.4% 16.8% 19.5% 19.9%
N 875 514 360 16 56 105 79 104
T-test old UW vs. new UW
90 days prior 0.98 4.94 0.05 0.39 3.14 3.86 2.40
90 days post 3.12 7.58 1.94 2.23 4.33 2.99 4.52
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the six variables) that will result in a maximum level of compe-
tition. If the market is perfectly competitive, the overall measure
for each deal will be equal to zero: in equilibrium, all deals pro-
vide the same service when all elements are considered. To find
the optimal weights, we solve for a system of equations where
the weights minimize the squared deviation from zero for each
20 For non-Nasdaq offerings, underwriters cannot directly compete onCompetition in investment banking
Our motivation for constructing a competitiveness score for
each deal is that equity issuers face a wide range of services
from underwriters, and must select an underwriter that provides
the best combination of services. This may result in paying higher
fees, or less accurate pricing if the issuer places high impor-
tance on analyst coverage or market making participation prior
to the deal, but overall, if underwriters are competing for issu-
ing clients, they are providing a set of services that addresses
the needs of the clients. While our prior analysis examines each
dimension of underwriter behavior separately, it ignores the interac-
tion between the various competitive dimensions. The competitive
score captures the more complex and multidimensional nature of
competition: on average, what importance is placed on analyst
coverage versus fees, pricing accuracy, etc. To the extent that issu-
ing firms value different things from an underwriter (e.g., some
may place utmost importance on market making, whereas others
place the most importance on low fees) we will have noise around
our measure, which only captures the common attributes of the
deals.
As our competitiveness score focuses on the behavior of the
lead underwriter, it is measuring the outcome of competition
between the unsuccessful investment banks that are not cho-
sen as the lead underwriter and the successful investment banks
that are chosen as the lead underwriter. If investment banks
are competing for underwriting mandates on these dimensions,
then we can compare the resulting behavior (competitiveness
scores) of the successful investment banks across deals. The
null hypothesis is that under a perfectly competitive equilibrium
these scores should all be equal. The finding that scores are not
equal is consistent with varying degrees of non-competitive behav-
ior.
3.1. Correlations among investment banking variables
As a first step to constructing an overall competitive score for each
deal, we gauge the interaction between attributes via correlations.
We standardize the relevant variables by subtracting the sample
mean from each observation and dividing the difference by the sam-
ple standard deviation. This results in each variable having a normal
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation of one. As some
of our variables are inverted (for example, lower fees are better) we
invert the standardized variables so that a positive value implies the
underwriter is “better” than the mean. There are 15 pair-wise cor-
relations between the six standardized variables. For non-Nasdaq
stocks we assign a neutral value of zero for the market making
variable.19
For the non-switchers, 10 correlations are significant: eight
positive and two negative. The significant negative correla-
tions are between market making with reputation and fees.
This result suggests that market making activity provided by
the lead underwriter prior to the offering may be a substitute
for these attributes. The eight significant positive correlations
suggest that high quality underwriter behavior along one dimen-
sion translates into high quality behavior along others: notably
fees are positively correlated with reputation, pricing discount,
and debt relationship. For the switchers, 11 correlations are
significant: ten positive and one negative (reputation is nega-
19 Alternatively we could work with the non-Nasdaq and Nasdaq sub-
samples separately. We have done this analysis and the results do not change
significantly.
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ively correlated with recommendation). Thus, as there is only
ne negative correlation, there is little evidence that underwrit-
rs consistently compensate for non-competitive behavior on
ultiple dimensions with competitive behavior on other dimen-
ions.
Overall, the correlation analysis suggests there are several strong
nteractions between the variables we are examining, and combin-
ng the variables into one competitive measure for each deal may
rovide more information than analyzing each variable individu-
lly.
.2. Construction of an overall measure of competition
e combine our standardized variables to provide a comprehen-
ive measure for each deal (scorei) of the competition for follow-on
fferings.20
corei = a1STD feei + a2STD discounti + a3STD reputationi
+a4STD MMi + a5STD reci + a6STD debti
An immediate problem in constructing this measure is how
o weight the various dimensions. As a first approximation,
e assume each (standardized) measure has the same impact
nd use equal weights to combine the six standardized mea-
ures of underwriter activity into a single measure of overall
nderwriter competition for each deal. Thus each attribute gets
weight of 1/6 (or 16.7%). The sample mean of our com-
rehensive measure is zero and its standard deviation is 0.53,
arrower than the standard deviation of one for the individ-
al z-scores, due to the correlations among variables. Follow-on
fferings associated with a measure of zero are deals with aver-
ge terms, whereas a positive measure represents a deal with
verall better terms and hence a more competitive lead under-
riter.
Equal-weighting may be problematic in that different elements
ay have different importance in the overall deal competitiveness.
here is no a priori reason to believe that, say, fees and market
aking will have the same impact on how competitive a deal is.
hus the second measure we use finds the weights that maximize
he overall level of competition in the market for follow-on offer-
ngs. The intuition here is that we try to find the set of weights (forhe market-making dimension and in our analysis we assign a neutral
tandardized value for market making for the non-Nasdaq offerings (i.e.
TD MM = 0). Similarly, for offerings with no analyst coverage, we assign
neutral value, STD rec = 0. In robustness checks we have replaced these
ssumptions by various alternatives, including calculating scores for Nasdaq
nd non-Nasdaq offerings separately with different weights, or assigning a
egative value to STD MM for the non-Nasdaq offerings, or assigning a
egative value to STD rec for offerings with no analyst coverage. Although
ur optimal weighting schemes differ under each of these alternatives, our
esults are not sensitive to these differences.
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for UBS Warburg. Thus, even within the top-tier underwriters, there
are substantial differences in underwriters’ abilities to retain and
attract investment banking clients. Underwriters with higher loy-
alty do have higher competitiveness scores (Pearson’s correlation0
eal21:
Min
a1,...,a6
1277∑
i=1
(scorei)2 = (a1STD feei + a2STD discounti + a3STD
s.t.
6∑
j=1
aj = 1
aj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , 6
The outcome of this optimization is presented in Panel A of
able 7. Interestingly, when we optimize the degree of market overall
ompetitiveness, reputation, market making, recommendations and
ebt relationship receive slightly higher weights than in the equal
eighting scheme and pricing discount receives a slightly lower
eight. It should also be noted that fees receive particularly low
eight (1.9%) and market making activity receives higher weight
han one would expect (23.3%). We can think of two reasons for
his outcome. First, since market making is negatively correlated
ith other deal features, to minimize variation, the weight on this
lement is larger. Second, fees are positively correlated with rep-
tation, pricing discount recommendations and debt relationship.
hus, to maximize competition, the weight given to this variable
s low. But overall, the weighting of the variables is not radically
ifferent between the two weighting schemes.
Since a deal’s score may be related to deal features (size of deal,
olatility of stock price, time since last deal, stock price performance
rior to offering) we examine the underwriter activity net of these
ffects, by regressing the deal’s competitive score on deal features
nd time dummies, and examining the residuals. The regression
esults (Table 7, Panel B) show that features of the deal are important
eterminants of the underwriter competitiveness, in ways consistent
ith prior results we present: larger deals have higher scores, risky
eals have lower scores, and the longer the time since last offering
ake the term of the deals less attractive.
More importantly, we are interested in the competitiveness of
eals in each of our switching and non-switching categories. If deal
eatures capture all the variation in competitive scores, then there
hould be no difference between the score for switching firms and
on-switching firms, because underwriters will provide competitive
verall service conditional upon the size and risk of the deal.
In Table 7, Panel C, we average the regression residuals for non-
witchers, and the five categories of switchers. We can reject our null
ypothesis of perfect competitiveness in five out of six cases. The
ignificantly positive average residual for non-switchers indicates
hat underwriters that retain clients are providing superior overall
ervice to those clients (controlling for deal size, price volatility,
tc.) above and beyond what would be required in a perfectly com-
etitive market. By contrast, we cannot reject the null for follow-on
fferings by firms that switch without any large change in reputa-
ion. The insignificant residuals indicate that underwriters are facing
ompetition for these deals. This is consistent with these deals hav-
ng the largest pool of potential underwriters as seen in Table 3
active investment banks).
When switching involves a large change in reputation, either up
r down, we reject the null as underwriters do not compete on the
21 Rather than using the public debt and private debt relationships sepa-
ately, we form one variable that takes the value one if the lead underwriter
as a prior public or private debt relationship, and zero otherwise. Then we
alculate standardized scores for this single debt variable.
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simensions we have outlined, rather providing poorer service overall
prior to the deal) than for other deals.22 These results are consistent
cross the weighting schemes and are robust to the exclusion of prior
ebt offerings as one of the competitive variables.23
.3. Investment bank competitiveness and client loyalty
n the analysis above we found that the competitiveness score dif-
ers across deals that retain an underwriter versus deals that switch
nderwriters, and that underwriters are competitive for deals that
witch without a large change in underwriter reputation. We now
onsider how this competitiveness score differs with attributes of
he investment bank.
In Table 8 Panel A we calculate the mean and median competi-
iveness score for the investment banks in our sample with a Carter
nd Manaster (1990) rank of 8 or 9 (the Megginson and Weiss (1991)
eputation measure is also presented). Overall, the highest ranked
CM = 9) investment banks have positive average competitiveness
cores and mostly positive median scores, whereas the investment
anks that are ranked CM = 8 have negative average and median
ompetitiveness scores. Thus, reputation is related to the overall
ervice quality provided by an underwriter leading up to a deal.
Investment banks providing higher quality overall service to
heir underwriting clients should have more success in retaining
lients and attracting new clients. If clients focus on a combina-
ion of underwriter services, rather than on one particular attribute
for example, analyst coverage), then our competitiveness score
hould explain the likelihood of an investment bank gaining or los-
ng a client. For the individual investment banks, we calculate a
oyalty index of their issuers, defined as the percentage of issuers
ho use the same bank for their next offering. Table 8 Panel A
hows that among the underwriters with CM rank greater than seven,
hese loyalty ranks range from a high of 83.6% for Goldman Sachs
o a low of 26.3% for Prudential. We also see that for Goldman
achs, 36% of deals come from new clients, whereas new clients
ccounted for 82% of deals for Thomas Weisel and 73% of deals22 For firms graduating to a high reputation underwriter, the below average
ervice prior to the deal (i.e., little analyst coverage or market making), does
ot translate into below average coverage after the deal.
23 We split the sample into two sub-periods for robustness. We calculate
ptimal weights for 1996–1999 and 2000–2003 separately and calculate
egression residuals for each sub-period. The results are consistent across
he sub-periods: significant positive residuals for non-switchers; significant
egative residuals for large up or down switchers; insignificant residuals
or same-rank switchers; weakly significant negative residuals for lateral
witchers.
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Table 7 Comprehensive measure of underwriter competitiveness. The underwriter score for each deal is the summation of the z-scores
for reputation, fees, discount, recommendation three months prior, market making volume three months prior to the offering, and prior debt
relationship. The z-scores are standardized measures with N(0,1) distributions that are calculated using the sample mean and standard deviation.
Panel A shows the weights used in calculating the comprehensive underwriter score using both equal weighting and optimal weighting that satisfies
the following: minimize score2 = (weights × competition variables)2 given that the weights = 1 and each weight ± 0. Panel B shows the
regression results when the underwriter score is regressed on deal characteristics. Offering size is measured as the log of global proceeds, price
volatility is the 90 day price volatility prior to the announcement of the offering, and the cumulative abnormal return is calculated over 252 trading
days prior to the announcement of the offering using the CRSP value-weighted index as the market return. Panel C provides results across the six
subgroups: non-switchers, large downgrading switchers, lateral downgrading switchers, same reputation switchers, lateral upgrading switchers,
and large upgrading switchers. The average abnormal score is the average residual from the regression in Panel B, and the t-statistic tests the
significance of difference of the average abnormal score from zero.
Panel A: weighting schemes
Score= Fees Discount Reputation Market making Recommendation Debt relationship
Equal weight 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7%
Optimized weight 1.9% 14.8% 21.0% 23.3% 22.0% 16.9%
Panel B: relation between deal attributes and score
Score= Intercept Offering size Price volatility Years since
last offering
CAR one
year prior
Year
dummies
R2
Equal weight −5.648 0.333 −5.098 −0.026 −0.085 Yes 40.1%
T-statistic −23.06*** 25.83*** −6.99*** −4.23*** −3.65***
Optimized weight −4.002 0.240 −4.296 −0.033 −0.069 Yes 25.3%
T-statistic −15.29*** 17.47*** −5.51*** −5.00*** −2.77***
Panel C: average abnormal score
Non-switchers
(n = 720)
Large down-graders
(n = 30)
Lateral down-graders
(n = 79)
Same rank
(n = 181)
Lateral upgraders
(n = 124)
Large upgraders
(n = 143)
Equal weighting
Abnormal score 0.07 −0.24 −0.08 −0.01 −0.06 −0.20
T statistic 4.98*** −2.82*** −1.88* −0.46 −1.71* −7.12***
Optimized weighting
Abnormal score 0.08 −0.27 −0.10 −0.02 −0.08 −0.19
T statistic 4.97*** −3.17*** −2.26** −0.74 −2.30** −6.82***
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in our sample by year and into quintiles each year based on the size
of the offering. We use the median value for the year-size-quintiles* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
coefficient = 0.82, p = 0.0001), suggesting that underwriter compet-
itiveness may explain the likelihood of an investment bank retaining
or losing clients.
In Table 8 Panel B we examine the relationship between under-
writer competitiveness and loyalty for all underwriters in our
sample, not only the highly ranked underwriters. We rank the 79
underwriters into five groups based on the average competitiveness
score per investment bank and calculate the average client loyalty
within each group. The least competitive investment banks have
17% loyalty, whereas the most competitive investment banks have
64% loyalty (t = 5.35).243.4. The determinants of gaining and losing underwriting business
The analysis above suggests that underwriters who retain clients are
providing superior aggregate service to their clients, and the opti-
24 When we exclude investment banks that have only underwritten one
or two deals in our sample, we find that the difference in loyalty shrinks
(52–70%) but the most competitive investment banks still have significantly
more loyal clients than the least competitive investment banks (t = 2.15).
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aized weighting scheme suggests that all dimensions of underwriter
ehavior that we include are important. We further examine the
imensions along which underwriters compete for deals via a prob-
bilistic regression to determine the likelihood of an underwriter
osing an existing client or gaining a new client.
To enhance comparability, we measure our variables of interest
elative to a benchmark. For some variables, there is a natural bench-
ark (for example, analyst recommendation versus the consensus),
ut for other variables we calculate a benchmark based on deal size
nd the year the deal was executed. To do this, we split all offeringss our benchmark for several independent variables as discussed in
etail below.25
25 As before, we calculate a neutral value for the market making dimension
or non-Nasdaq firms (i.e., their market making value equals the median
alue for the Nasdaq firms in the relevant year-size-quintile). We have per-
ormed robustness checks by replacing this assumption with alternatives,
ncluding estimating separate results for Nasdaq and non-Nasdaq offer-
ngs: the significance and direction of our results do not change under these
lternative scenarios.
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Table 8 Investment bank loyalty and competitiveness. Panel A presents the lead underwriters with a Carter–Manaster rank of 8 or 9 (Column
1). The second and third columns present reputation based on the dollar volume of underwriting during the 1996–2003 period (Megginson and
Weiss, 1991), and the number of deals underwritten in our sample. In total there were 79 underwriters for our sample of 1277 follow-on equity
offerings. The overall underwriter quality measure from Table 7 is calculated for each deal, and the average and median values per investment
bank are presented in columns 4 and 5. The loyalty of previous deals is calculated within our sample, it is a measure of the number of firms
that stay with the investment bank. In the numerator is the number of deals that stayed for a follow-on offering with the same lead underwriter
and in the denominator is the total number of deals that the investment bank acted as a lead in a prior equity offering = firms that stayed with
lead underwriter + firms that switched to another lead underwriter. In Panel B the investment banks are sorted into five groups based on average
competitiveness score, and we calculate the average of the loyalty scores for each group. We test the difference in loyalty between the most and
least competitive underwriter groups via a t-test.
Panel A: high reputation underwriters
Investment banka Carter–Manaster
rank
Market share (all
equity offerings
1996–2003)
# SEOs Average
competitive
score
Median
competitive
score
Loyalty score Deals from
new clients
Merrill Lynch 9 13.2% 98 0.245 0.181 79.7% 47
Goldman Sachs 9 15.8% 80 0.233 0.163 83.6% 29
Deutsche Bank/BT Alex Brown 9 3.3% 97 0.223 0.210 69.2% 23
Salomon Smith Barney 9 11.3% 75 0.170 0.131 52.2% 39
Credit Suisse First Boston 9 7.6% 95 0.158 0.066 77.3% 37
Donaldson Lufkin & Jenretteb 9 3.9% 61 0.139 0.112 65.0% 22
BA Securities/Montgomery 8 2.5% 81 0.112 0.113 62.7% 34
Lehman Brothers 8.76 4.5% 50 0.108 0.124 58.9% 17
Morgan Stanley 9 12.3% 88 0.061 −0.029 66.2% 41
Hambrecht & Quist/JP Morgan 9 5.4% 66 0.023 0.035 63.6% 24
Bear Stearns 8 2.4% 44 0.002 0.009 67.6% 21
CIBC Oppenheimer 8 0.9% 29 −0.100 −0.064 50.0% 16
Prudential Volpe 8 1.3% 28 −0.114 0.028 26.3% 18
PaineWebber 8 0.9% 13 −0.162 −0.038 32.0% 5
Thomas Weisel 8 0.3% 11 −0.164 −0.089 50.0% 9
UBS Warburg 8 3.2% 51 −0.227 −0.228 48.3% 37
Schroder Wertheim & Coc 8 0.2% 7 0.245 0.181 33.3% 4
Panel B: client loyalty of investment banks ranked on competitiveness
All investment banks
Obs Average competitiveness score Average loyalty score
Low competitiveness 16 −1.12 17.1%
16 −0.58 37.5%
15 −0.32 38.2%
16 −0.06 54.2%
High competitiveness 16 0.16 64.4%
T-test (high vs. low) 5.35
a Four investment banks that have a Carter–Manaster ranking of 8 were not included in this table as they have only 2 deals in our sample (Dean Witter
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models. In the first model we analyze the individual dimensions of
underwriter competition. In the second model we also include the
underwriter loyalty index to determine whether the probability of
losing a client in a particular deal is related to the average loyalty ofReynolds, merged with Morgan Stanley on February 5, 1997; NatWest Se
during 1996–2000 and a CM rank of 8 for 2001–2003, thus the rank is the
b This reflects deals underwritten by DLJ during 1996–August 2000. DL
c This reflects deals underwritten by Schroder Wertheim prior to merge
When analyzing the probability of losing a client, the depen-
ent variable takes the value of one if the underwriter loses the
ssuing client and zero if the issuing firm remains with the under-
riter. The independent variables of interest are the old underwriter
eputation, market making volume of the old lead underwriter mea-
ured three months prior to the offering, analyst recommendation
f the old lead 90 days prior to the offering date, fees, underpricing
iscount, prior debt relationship, loyalty index of old lead under-
riter and average underwriter competitiveness score of old lead
nderwriter.26
26 Not all underwriters provide research coverage and recommendations for
he stock. In general lack of coverage by the lead underwriter is a certainly a
n
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os; ABN AMRO; Sandler O’Neill). Lehman Brothers had a CM rank of 9
-weighted average rank over our sample time period.
s acquired by CSFB August 30, 2000.
Citigroup in May 2000.
In Table 9 we show logit regression results for three differentegative. Erring on the conservative side, rather than setting a missing rec-
mmendation to 0 (which represents a very negative recommendation, given
hat a ranking of 1 represents a sell recommendation), we assigned a neutral
ecommendation (ranking of 3) for all missing observations. Assigning a
egative recommendation, rather than a neutral recommendation to all cases
here the underwriter did not provide research coverage to the stock, makes
ur results (reported below) even stronger.
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Table 9 Likelihood of losing an underwriting client. This table shows the results of logistic regressions modeling the likelihood of an underwriter
losing a client. We restrict our sample to 1196 offerings done by underwriters who underwrote five or more deals during our sample time period.
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the underwriter loses a client and zero if the underwriter keeps a client. We use three different
models, measuring the underwriter competition either individually (Models 1 and 2) or via our overall measure (Model 3). The reputation, market
making volume, fee, and discount variables are measured relative to year-deal size quintile medians. Non-Nasdaq deals have the value zero for
market making volume. Recommendations are measured relative to the consensus for the firm, and debt relationship is one if the underwriter
had either a private or public debt relationship with the firm in the five years prior to the equity offering. Deal size is measured as the log of
the deal proceeds in millions; price volatility is the standard deviation of returns 90 days prior to the filing date; one year abnormal return is the
cumulative abnormal return measured over the year prior to the filing date using the CRSP value-weighted index as the market; time since last
offering is measured in years. Table 8 describes the loyalty and quality measures used in Models 2 and 3. The reported slopes are transformations
of the model coefficients to allow simpler interpretation of the results. The slopes are the marginal effect of each independent variable, calculated
by evaluating the partial derivative at every observation and then averaging to get the sample average (see Greene, 1997, p. 876). The p-values
are the logit coefficient p-values.
Prob (lose a client) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Slope p value Slope p value Slope p value
Intercept 0.00 0.00 0.12
Reputation −0.058 0.00 −0.055 0.00
Market making volume −0.482 0.00 −0.481 0.00
Recommendation vs. consensus −0.038 0.00 −0.038 0.00
Fee −0.031 0.15 −0.030 0.16
Discount −0.768 0.06 −0.712 0.08
Debt relationship −0.053 0.18 −0.050 0.21
Deal size −0.068 0.00 −0.060 0.00 −0.042 0.01
Price volatility −1.710 0.04 −1.686 0.04 −1.146 0.17
1 year abnormal return 0.055 0.03 0.051 0.04 0.074 0.00
Time since last offering 0.073 0.00 0.072 0.00 0.098 0.00
Old lead loyalty −0.151 0.06
Old lead avg quality −0.329 0.00
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next, these relative measures will be zero. Also, to examine whether
underwriters compete on price, the fee and underpricing discount
relative to the year-size-quintile median are included. In comparison
to the standard choice model, this analysis is a conditional analy-Pseudo-R2 44.5%
the underwriter’s clients in addition to the underwriter’s competitive
behavior. In the third model we replace the individual dimensions
by our single measure of underwriter competition. For easier inter-
pretation of the regression results we present slope coefficients for
each variable, rather than the logit parameters. The slope coefficients
represent the average marginal effect of each independent variable,
calculated by evaluating the partial derivative at each observation
and averaging across the sample (see for example Greene, 1997).
The logit regressions results in Table 9 show that underwriters
who fail to provide an acceptable level of service to their clients
(via reputation, analyst recommendations and market making activ-
ity) have a greater likelihood of losing future underwriting business.
Similarly, though with less statistical significance, charging lower
fees for their services and exacting a smaller discount increases
the likelihood of being retained as the lead banker. From the first
model, it is clear that rather than one dimension, all services, except
prior debt underwriting relationship, are important in the competi-
tive calculus of retaining existing clients. Several control variables
for attributes of the deal are also important: smaller deals, firms
with infrequent equity deals, and firms with recent price run-ups
are less likely to be retained by underwriters. In the second model,
underwriters who have higher loyalty are less likely to lose clients,
and if we replace the individual underwriter attributes by our over-
all measure of underwriter quality (third model), we also find that
underwriters with lower quality are more likely to lose clients.
We perform a similar analysis for the probability of gaining
clients, and examine how underwriter behavior, measured by both
the overall quality measure and separate dimensions, affects this
likelihood of gaining a new client.
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r44.8% 35.5%
We conduct this analysis in two ways. First, we follow the
ethodology of other researchers (for example, Drucker and Puri,
005) and use all potential underwriters as our dataset. The depen-
ent variable takes the value of one if the investment bank is chosen
s the new lead underwriter, and zero otherwise. The interpretation
f the explanatory coefficients in this regression is how additional
ervices (analyst coverage, market making, loan arranging) are
elated to the likelihood of being chosen as the lead underwriter.
Second, we do an alternative analysis that only compares the
ew lead underwriter to the prior lead underwriter. The dependent
ariable in this logit regression takes the value of one if the lead
nderwriter is new, and zero if the lead underwriter remains the
ame from the last offering. The explanatory variables capture the
elative competitiveness of the new lead underwriter compared to
he old lead underwriter on the dimensions of reputation, analyst
ecommendation 90 days prior to the offering, market making activ-
ty three months before the offering, and prior debt relationship.27
f the lead underwriter remains the same from one offering to the27 As before, we apply a neutral value for market making and recommenda-
ions if these variables are missing. In robustness checks, where we instead
se negative values for missing variables, or treat Nasdaq and non-Nasdaq
eals separately, and we find the direction and statistical significance of our
egression coefficients are unaltered.
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Table 10 Likelihood of gaining a client. In Panel A the dependent variable takes the value of one for the investment bank that is chosen as
the lead underwriter and zero for all other investment banks. We measure the investment bank’s behavior relative to the median level for deal
year-size-quintiles. Non-Nasdaq deals have neutral market making values for all investment banks. Debt relationship is 1 if the investment bank
has underwritten a public debt offering or arranged a private loan in the five years prior to the deal. The variable “is old underwriter” takes the
value one if the investment bank was the lead underwriter in the most recent equity offering. Sample size for Panel A is 411 investment banks
for 1277 deals: 524,847 observations. In Panel B we only include the new lead underwriters. The sample is 1196 offerings done by underwriters
with at least five deals during our sample time period. The dependent variable takes the value of one if the underwriter gains a client and zero
if the underwriter keeps a client. We use four separate models to evaluate the likelihood of an underwriter gaining a client: Models 1 and 2
use the individual dimensions of underwriter competition; Models 3 and 4 use the overall measure; and in Models 2 and 4 we include old lead
underwriter’s loyalty index (defined in Table 8). The reputation, market making volume, fee, discount, recommendation, and debt relationship
variables are measured relative to the old underwriter, thus underwriters who keep clients have values of zero for these variables. Non-Nasdaq
deals have zero values for the market making variable. Deal size is measured as the log of the deal proceeds in millions; price volatility is the
standard deviation of returns 90 days prior to the filing date; one year abnormal return is the cumulative abnormal return measured over the year
prior to the filing date using the CRSP value-weighted index as the market; time since last offering is measured in years. The quality of the SEO
lead underwriter (defined in Table 8) is measured relative to the quality of the old lead underwriter. The reported slopes are transformations of
the model coefficients to allow simpler interpretation of the results. The slopes are the marginal effect of each independent variable, calculated
by evaluating the partial derivative at every observation and then averaging to get the sample average (see Greene, 1997, p. 876). The p-values
are the logit coefficient p-values.
Panel A: choice model
Prob (chosen as lead underwriter) Slope p value
Intercept 0.00
Is old underwriter 0.0058
Reputation vs. Median 0.0012 0.00
Market making volume vs. Median 0.0053 0.00
Recommendation vs. Consensus 0.0005 0.00
Fee −0.00002 0.01
Discount 0.0005 0.71
Debt relationship 0.0021 0.00
Deal size 0.0003 0.00
Price volatility −0.0022 0.49
1 year abnormal return 0.0002 0.06
Time since last offering 0.00007 0.01
Pseudo-R2 57.5%
Panel B: new lead underwriter versus old lead underwriter
Prob (gain a client) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Slope p value Slope p value Slope p value Slope p value
Intercept 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
Reputation vs. old und 0.120 0.00 0.119 0.00
Market making volume vs. old und −0.961 0.00 −0.973 0.00
Recommendation vs. old und 0.007 0.26 0.006 0.24
Fee −0.033 0.12 −0.029 0.12
Discount −0.481 0.22 −0.397 0.31
New und debt relationship vs. old 0.063 0.22 0.062 0.16
Deal size −0.052 0.00 −0.040 0.00 −0.066 0.00 −0.048 0.00
Price volatility −0.857 0.27 −0.785 0.27 −0.649 0.42 −0.574 0.47
1 year abnormal return 0.068 0.01 0.061 0.01 0.079 0.00 0.067 0.01
Time since last offering 0.095 0.00 0.094 0.00 0.100 0.00 0.098 0.00
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is, as it examines the variation across investment banks that are
hosen to be lead underwriters. This method allows us to analyze
he cross-section of lead underwriters, rather than comparing lead
nderwriters with non-underwriters. The regression results are in
able 10 with slope coefficients reported for easier interpretation of
he results.
In Table 10 Panel A, the results of a multinomial choice model
how that providing analyst recommendations, loan arranging, mar-
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et making or high reputation increase the likelihood of becoming a
ead underwriter. In Panel B we use four different specifications of
he conditional regression. In the first and second models we test the
elationship between the likelihood of gaining a client and the indi-
idual dimensions of underwriter competition. In the second model
e also include the loyalty index of the prior underwriter, to deter-
ine whether client loyalty has an influence. In the third and fourth
odels we replace the individual dimensions of underwriter compe-
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tition by our single overall measure. In these regressions we measure
underwriter quality relative to the quality of the prior underwriter,
thus the measure (SEO Lead Avg Quality vs. Old) is the difference
between the overall measure for the new underwriter and the old
underwriter. In the fourth model we also add the loyalty index for
the old underwriter to determine whether it is easier for underwriters
to gain clients from investment banks that have less loyal clients.
As 267 of the 557 switching firms upgrade their underwriter,
the probability of gaining a client is positively related to reputation.
However, of these upgrading firms, almost half (124) are lateral
upgraders, moving up only one Carter–Manaster reputation rank.
Also, the positive (though not significant) coefficient on the rec-
ommendation variable indicates that as the new lead underwriter’s
recommendation gets stronger (relative to the old underwriter), its
chances of becoming the lead underwriter improve. As seen in the
univariate results, competition on market making is not generally
important: new underwriters are less active market makers than cur-
rent underwriters. New lead underwriters charge fees that are higher
than the median fees charged for similar size deals, though once the
loyalty index of the old lead underwriter is included, this relation-
ship disappears. Due to the infrequent number of debt–equity links,
a prior debt underwriting relationship is not important to gaining
equity underwriting business.
We also find that it is harder for investment banks to gain clients
from underwriters with high client loyalty (Models 2 and 4), and
investment banks with higher overall quality measures have a higher
chance of gaining clients (Model 3). When we put both the old lead
underwriter’s loyalty and the new lead underwriter’s quality into the
regression (Model 4) we find that both have a significant impact on
the likelihood of gaining a client, with the marginal effect of the
new lead underwriter’s quality being approximately 50% stronger
than the old lead underwriter’s loyalty.
In summary, our underwriter quality score and loyalty index
are significant in explaining the likelihood of retaining or gaining
clients. It also appears that the lead underwriter providing opti-
mistic recommendations several months prior to the offering is an
important determinant of the competitive environment.
4. Conclusions
Is the market for investment banking services competitive? In this
research we focus on a conditional analysis of supply-side compe-
tition by looking at how underwriters compete for follow-on equity
offerings. Our results reveal several important aspects of the extent
of market competition for follow-on offerings.
Of the 1277 offerings in our sample, 44% change lead under-
writers from their previous equity offering, which is suggestive of
a competitive market. However, we also show that most potential
underwriters are not involved with the equity issuers on any dimen-
sion of competition, unlike the old and new underwriters who are
often engaged in market making or analyst coverage prior to the deal.
For this reason, we focus on how new lead underwriters compete
against prior lead underwriters. We find that while many chang-
ing firms “graduate” to better underwriters, most of the changing
firms are moving laterally or are down-grading in terms of the lead
investment banker’s quality. This tendency to shift rather than grad-
uate in terms of underwriters’ quality gives greater importance to
understanding how underwriters compete for business.
Analyzing the individual dimensions of competition, it is clearly
the case that a dominant force is investment bank reputation. When a
firm moves to a higher reputation investment bank, it does so despite
R
B45
he fact that the new underwriter is likely to charge higher fees, is not
oing to provide a more optimistic outlook for its stock prior to the
eal, and will not provide better market making services. For these
eals, investment banks do not need to be competitive to attract new
lients: their reputation alone is the draw card.
The picture is rather different when a lateral move is considered.
ere we find that the new lead underwriter is more optimistic before
he offering than is the old underwriter, suggesting that greater
ptimism may be a reason for the switch. We also find that old
nderwriters for switching firms were less active market makers
efore the offering than in the case for non-switching firms.
We then construct a comprehensive measure of competition
hich accounts for the potential interaction among the various ele-
ents of competition. Clearly the scores are related to the deal
eatures: follow-on offerings of small firms, more volatile firms,
nd firms with more asymmetric information have lower scores.
hat is, those deals are likely to be associated with higher fees,
ower reputation underwriter, etc.
However, when we account for firm’s characteristics, we estab-
ish that investment banks do compete to attract clients from
imilarly ranked investment banks. Underwriters are providing more
ervices than a competitive equilibrium would require for follow-on
fferings from firms who do not switch, suggesting that banks work
ard to retain clients. Conversely, firms who move to more reputable
nderwriters gain reputable underwriters, but pay rather dearly on
ther dimensions, resulting in the worst overall level of competition
or those issuers.
We are able to establish that the more competitive investment
anks are more likely to gain new clients, especially from other
nvestment banks who have low client loyalty: our comprehensive
easure of investment bank competitiveness for each deal is related
o the likelihood of an investment bank gaining or losing clients,
hich suggests that the quality of service provided by an invest-
ent bank to its clients does matter. Investment banks that are not
erforming up to par are more likely to lose clients, and have lower
evels of client loyalty.
Our analysis suggests that investment banks compete when they
eed to: firms who seek a higher reputation underwriter face rela-
ively non-competitive markets, but investment banks compete for
ustomers who switch to similarly ranked underwriters. Overall, our
esults suggest that aggressive investment banks are able to steal cus-
omers away from complacent incumbent banks, a result very much
n accord with markets being competitive.
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